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Causal decision theory (CDT) says that you should do your best to im-
prove the world in which you find yourself. An act is choiceworthy to
the extent that you expect it to promote valuable ends. In contrast, ev-
idential decision theory (EDT) says that you should give yourself good
news about the world. An act is choiceworthy to the extent that it indi-
cates valuable ends. Causal decision theorists complain that EDT pre-
scribes an irrational policy of ‘managing the news’—favoring acts that
provide good news about the world, even when they make the world
worse than the alternatives would. CDT’s solution is to not manage any
news. When it evaluates an act for choiceworthiness, it ignores what the
performance of that act would tell you about what the world is like.
Which act you choose to perform can give you news about which
goods the world has provided for you, and this kind of news is rightly
disregarded when deciding how to act. But which act you choose may
also give you news about which goods you are in a position to bring
about, and this kind news ought not be disregarded. In ignoring all the
news that your acts may carry, CDT ignores important correlations be-
tween your choice and the goods you are in a position to bring about.
For this reason, I’ve come to think that CDT is in need of revision. Ac-
cording to the revision I favor, EDT does not err in managing the news.
Instead, its error lies in managing the wrong kind of news—it does not
discriminate between good news about the provisions of nature and
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good news about the extent to which you will improve upon the provi-
sions of nature. In rough outline, the revision of CDT I propose coun-
sels you to prefer acts which carry the news that they wouldmake things
better, disprefer acts which carry the news that they would make things
worse, and ignore any news about how good things are before you act.
To briefly highlight some properties of this theory: in contrast to or-
thodox CDT, its recommendations do not depend upon how likely you
think you are to select any particular act. Unlike orthodox CDT, it will
not change its verdicts if we introduce new options which are indistin-
guishable from existing options in all respects you care about. Addition-
ally, if it says that an act is to be preferred to every other alternative in
a pairwise choice between the two, then it will say that that act is to be
preferred to every other alternative on the full menu of options. Inter-
estingly, this isn’t so for orthodox CDT, which will sometimes say that
an act would be permissible, given a pairwise choice between it and ev-
ery other alternative, but is impermissible to select from the full menu
of options.
This theory will sometimes tell you to disprefer a causally ratifiable
act (an act you will expect to do the most good possible, if you choose
it) to a causally unratifiable act (an act you will expect to do less good
than an alternative would, if you choose it). It will also, in esoteric cases,
tell you tomost prefer a causally dominated act—an act which would do
less good than some alternative, no matter what the world is like. These
two properties can seem unattractive when considered in the abstract.
Nonetheless, there are particular decisions inwhich causally unratifiable
acts appearmore choiceworthy than their causally ratifiable alternatives;
and there are particular decisions in which causally dominated acts ap-
pear rational. I’ll suggest that it is a virtue of the theory that it agrees
with, and helps to explain, the intuitive verdicts about these cases.
1 Orthodox Causal DecisionTheory
1.1 Desirability
Let’s assume that, for each epistemically possible world w , we have a
measure of how strongly you desire w to be actual—we’ll write that
‘D(w )’.1 If we assume the number of worlds to be finite, then with the
1. I assume thatDmeasures desires on an interval scale—it is unique up to positive affine
transformation.
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values D(w ) and your subjective probability function, Pr, defined over
all propositions (sets of these worlds), we may define the desirability of
a proposition, φ, as follows:2
D(φ) def=∑
w
Pr(w |φ) ·D(w )
This definition says: to calculate the desirability of a proposition φ, ask
yourself how well satisfied you would expect your desires to be, were
you to learn only thatφ is true. Propositions with higherD-values give
evidence that your desires are satisfied to a greater extent, and proposi-
tions with lowerD-values give evidence that your desires are satisfied to
a lesser extent.
Suppose you are choosing whether to perform an act A, and S1, S2,
. . . , SN are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive states of the world.
Then, it follows from the definition of D that the desirability of your
performing A is given by:3
D(A) =∑
S
Pr(S | A) ·D(SA)
By the way, throughout, I’ll use non-italic letters like ‘A’ and ‘S’ to stand
for acts and states, and I’ll use italic letters like ‘A’ and ‘S ’ to stand for
the proposition that you perform the act A and that the state S obtains,
respectively.
1.2 Newcomb’s Problem
Evidential decision theory (EDT) says that this quantity,D(A), measures
the choiceworthiness of an act A. It says that you should prefer A to B,
A ≻ B, iff D(A) > D(B ). In a slogan, it tells you to most prefer the acts
that you’d be most glad to learn you had performed. As the evidential
decision theorist Richard Jeffrey puts it: “there is no effective difference
between asking whether you prefer A to B as a news item or as an act,
for youmake the news”.4 Inmost ordinary cases, giving yourself the best
news coincides with doing your best to improve the world. However,
there is a class of decision problems in which giving yourself good news
2. I abuse notation, writing ‘Pr(w |φ)’ instead of ‘Pr({w} |φ)’.
3. See §5.4 of Richard Jeffrey,The Logic of Decision (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).
4. Jeffrey, ibid., p. 84.
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can make matters worse.5 Consider Newcomb’s Problem.6
Newcomb’s Problem
Behind door #1 is either $1,000,000 or nothing at all. Be-
hind door #2, there is a guaranteed $10,000. Normally,
contestants have to choose between taking a chance onwin-
ning amillion dollarswith door #1 orwalking awaywith the
guaranteed $10,000 behind door #2. But this is the celebrity
version of the game, and you are playing for charity, so
they’ve made the game a bit easier: if you want, you are
free to open both doors and take whatever money you find.
Incidentally, before the show was taped, the producers an-
alyzed your social media accounts with AI bots in an ef-
fort to predict how you would behave. If the bots predicted
that you would open only door #1, then the producers put
$1,000,000 behind door #1. If, however, they predicted that
you would open both doors, then they put nothing behind
door #1. The predictions of these bots are 51% reliable.7 You
are told all of this once filming begins.
The decision you face in Newcomb’s Problem is an easy one. You get
to open both doors and take both prizes. You may find yourself in a
good world in which $1,000,000 awaits behind door #1, or youmay find
yourself in an unfortunate world in which nomoney awaits behind door
#1. If the world is good, taking both prizes does the most to improve it.
If the world is unfortunate, even so, taking both prizes does the most to
improve it. So, in either case, taking both prizes does the most good. So
you should take both prizes.
EDT, however, advises you to leave a prize behind. The reason is that,
if you were to learn that you had taken both prizes, you would expect to
5. There is some controversy about whether these are genuine decision problems at all.
For an argument that they are not, see Richard Jeffrey, “Causality in the Logic of Deci-
sion,” Philosophical Topics, xxi, 1 (1993): 139–51, and Richard Jeffrey, Subjective Proba-
bility: The RealThing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). For a reply, see
James M. Joyce, “Are Newcomb Problems Really Decisions?,” Synthese, clvi, 3 (2007):
537–62.
6. See Robert Nozick, “Newcomb’s Problem and Two Principles of Choice,” in Nicholas
Rescher, ed., Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969), pp. 114–
46.
7. That is, the probability that the bots predicted you would open both doors, given that
you do, is 51%. And the probability that the bots predicted you would only open door
#1, given that you only open door #1, is 51%. This is how I’ll continue to understand
‘reliable’ throughout.
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walk away with less money; and, if you were to learn that you had left
a prize behind, then you would expect to walk away with more. Let ‘O’
(for one) be the act of opening only door #1, and let ‘B’ (for both) be the
act of opening both doors. Let ‘M ’ (formillion) be the proposition that
there are a million dollars behind door #1. Then, the desirability of the
‘news item’ O is8
D(O) = Pr(M |O) ·D(MO) + Pr(¬M |O) ·D(¬MO)
= 51% · 1,000,000 + 49% · 0
= 510,000
whereas the desirability of the ‘news item’ B is:
D(B ) = Pr(M | B ) ·D(MB ) + Pr(¬M | B ) ·D(¬MB )
= 49% · 1,010,000 + 51% · 10,000
= 500,000
So the proposition O is more desirable than the proposition B—you
should be glad to learn that you choseO, and sad to learn that you chose
B. Nonetheless, B is more choiceworthy than O. Choosing B gains you
$10,000, no matter what. And choosing O loses you $10,000, no matter
what.
So Newcomb’s Problem shows us that Jeffrey was incorrect: there
is an effective difference between asking whether you should prefer A to
B as a news item, and asking whether A is more choiceworthy than B.
Sometimes, choosing the act which will accomplish themost good gives
you reason to think that the world is bad. Nonetheless, it is rational to
choose the act which will accomplish themost good. So sometimes, you
should be distressed to learn that you are choosing rationally. At least,
I take these to be the lessons of Newcomb’s Problem. There are many
others who disagree,9 but in what follows, I will take these lessons to
heart.
8. I suppose that your desires are linear in dollars.
9. See, for instance, Jeffrey,TheLogic of Decision, op. cit., Arif Ahmed, Evidence, Decision,
and Causality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), ChristopherMeek and
Clark Glymour, “Conditioning and Intervening,”The British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science, xlv, 4 (1994): 1001–21, Christopher Hitchcock, “Conditioning, Intervening,
and Decision,” Synthese, cxciv, 4 (2016): 1157–76, and Reuben Stern, “Interventionist
DecisionTheory,” Synthese, cxciv, 10 (2017): 4133–53.
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1.3 Tickles
I say that EDT recommends leaving a prize behind, but not all defenders
of EDT agree. Some say that, in my analysis of Newcomb’s Problem, I
neglected one crucial piece of evidence at your disposal. Prior to delib-
eration, you will know whether you are leaning towards selecting both
doors or whether you are leaning towards selecting only the one—that
is, you will have information about your pre-deliberation inclinations.10
Let’s call this additional information a ‘tickle’. This tickle will tell you
something about how you’ll end up choosing, and this will, by itself, tell
you something about whether the world is fortunate or unfortunate. It
could be that, once you’ve taken the tickle into account by conditioning
your probability function on it, your eventual choice will not give you
any additional news about whether the world is fortunate or not. Then,
youwill no longer be sad to learn that you’ve chosenB, andEDTwill rec-
ommend taking both prizes. More generally, since EDT says that your
pre-deliberation probabilities and desires should determine your choice,
these probabilities and desires should completely screen off your choice
from the bots’ prediction.11 Since you have introspective access to these
initial probabilities and desires, then, your choice will be independent
of the bots’ prediction, and EDT will recommend taking both prizes.
The causal decision theorist needn’t, and shouldn’t, deny that the
tickles of our initial inclinations, probabilities, or desires can teach us
something about the likely consequences of our actions. What they
should deny is that tickles like thesewill always do so—for three reasons.
Firstly, you may not have introspective access to your own probabilities
and desires.12 Secondly, though your probabilities and desires may de-
termine your choice, you need not know precisely how they will do so.
In that case, they need not screen off your choice from the bots’ pre-
dictions. Thirdly, and relatedly, you need not be following the advice
of EDT in order for EDT to give that advice. Suppose that you make
this decision unreflectively, without bothering to think about it at all. In
10. See Ellery Eells, “Causality, Utility, and Decision,” Synthese, xxxviii, 2 (1981): 295–329,
and Ellery Eells, Rational Decision and Causality (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1982).
11. To say that the tickle ‘screens off ’ your decision from the bots’ prediction is just to say
that, conditional on the tickle, your act and the bots’ prediction are probabilistically
independent.
12. Perhaps a suitably idealized agentwould have initrospective access to their own proba-
bilities and desires. Even so, you may not. See David Lewis, “Causal DecisionTheory,”
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, lix, 1 (1981): 5–30.
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that case, even though you do not follow EDT, EDT may still be used
to evaluate your act as rational or irrational. Because your deliberation
provided you with no information to screen off your act from the bots’
predictions, EDT will say that leaving a prize behind was the rational
choice.13
1.4 Utility
When EDT is evaluating the choiceworthiness of the the act A, it uses a
probability function conditioned on A. But conditioning on A can pro-
vide you with two, importantly different, kinds of information. Firstly,
it can provide information about states which are causally downstream
of your act. In this way, conditioning on A provides you with informa-
tion about the good your act stands to causally promote. Secondly, it
can provide information about states which are correlated with, though
not causally downstream from, your act. In this way, conditioning on
A provides you with information, not about the good you stand to pro-
mote, but rather about the good the world has provided for you.
We may separate the states of the world, S, into the factors which
are not causally downstream of your act—call these ‘K’—and the factors
which are causally downstream of your act—call those ‘C’. Then,
D(A) =∑
S
Pr(S | A) ·D(SA)
=
∑
K
∑
C
Pr(K C | A) ·D(K C A)
=
∑
K
Pr(K | A)︸ ︷︷ ︸
evidential
·∑
C
Pr(C | K A)︸ ︷︷ ︸
causal
·D(K C A)
In the difference it makes to the terms Pr(C | K A), conditioning on the
proposition A provides causal information about which states your act
promotes. In the difference it makes to the terms Pr(K | A), conditioning
on the proposition A provides evidential information about which states
your act merely indicates, but does not cause.
13. See Frank Jackson and Robert Pargetter, “Where the Tickle Defense Goes Wrong,”
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, lxi, 3 (1983): 295–99. Here, I have presupposed
that EDT is at least partly an evaluative theory which says whether a given act is ratio-
nal or irrational for a given agent in a given decision scenario, even if that agent isn’t
being guided by that theory. There are other ways of understanding EDT; and these
alternative understandings may escape the Newcomb objection.
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For this reason, EDT encourages you to engage in an irrational pol-
icy of ‘managing of the news’. It tells you to select only door #1, leav-
ing a prize behind, because this gives you good news about how much
money has been provided to you. However, choosing just door #1 does
notmake the world any better—it is, in fact, guaranteed tomakematters
worse. The causal decision theorist therefore suggests removing A’s ev-
idential influence onD(A) by replacing the terms Pr(K | A) with Pr(K ).
Thereby, CDT does not consider themerely evidential value of the actA.
Rather, it considers only its causal value. Let’s call the resulting quantity
the utility of an act, U (A),14
U (A) def=∑
K
Pr(K ) ·∑
C
Pr(C | K A) ·D(K C A)
=
∑
K
Pr(K ) ·D(K A)
While EDT measures the choiceworthiness of an act A with its ‘news
value’, D(A), CDT measures the choiceworthiness of A with its utility,
U (A).
1.5 Utility Can Vary With Your Act Probabilities
One important feature of the measure U is that its values can depend
upon how confident you are that you will end up selecting each avail-
able act (call these your act probabilities). For instance, in Newcomb’s
Problem, your probability that there is a million dollars behind door #1
depends upon how likely you think you are to to take both prizes. If b
is your probability that you’ll take both prizes, then
Pr(M ) = Pr(M | B ) · b + Pr(M |O) · (1− b )
= 0.51− 0.02b
and Pr(¬M ) = Pr(¬M | B ) · b + Pr(¬M |O) · (1− b )
= 0.49+ 0.02b
14. This is Brian Skyrms’s formulation of CDT. See his “Causal Decision Theory,” this
Journal, lxxix, 11 (1982): 695–711. For alternatives, see Allan Gibbard and William
Harper, “Counterfactuals and TwoKinds of Expected Utility”, in A. Hooker, J. J. Leach,
and E. F. McClennan, eds., Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory (Dor-
drecht: D. Reidel, 1978): pp. 125–62, David Lewis, “Causal Decision Theory”, op. cit.,
Jordan Howard Sobel, Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice (Cambridge: Cam-
bridgeUniversity Press, 1994), and JamesM. Joyce,TheFoundations of Causal Decision
Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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Figure 1: The line in solid black shows the utility of B , as a function of Pr(B ).
The line in dotted grey shows the utility of O , as a function of Pr(B ).
For this reason, the utility of O and B will similarly depend upon how
likely you are to take both prizes:
U (O) = Pr(M ) · 1,000,000 + Pr(¬M ) · 0
= 510,000 − 20,000b
and U (B ) = Pr(M ) · 1,010,000 + Pr(¬M ) · 10,000
= 520,000− 20,000b
So as your probability for taking both prizes goes up, the utility of tak-
ing both prizes goes down. And as your probability for leaving a prize
behind goes up, so too does the utility of leaving a prize behind. (See
figure 1.)
Let’swrite ‘UB (A)’ for the utility youwould assign toA’s performance,
were you to learn that you had performed B,
UB (A) def=
∑
K
Pr(K | B ) ·D(K A)
Notice that the desirability of A, D(A), is just UA(A). So EDT says that
you should ‘manage the news’ about utility by preferring acts which give
better news about their own utility. For instance, in Newcomb’s Prob-
lem, it comparesO with B by comparing the value of U (O) on the left-
hand-side of the graph from figure 1 (where Pr(O) = 1) with the value of
U (B ) on the right-hand-side of the graph (where Pr(B ) = 1). The value
of U (O) on the left-hand-side of the graph is just UO (O) =D(O), while
the value of U (B ) on the right-hand-side of the graph is UB (B ) = D(B ).
Since UO (O) is greater than UB (B ), EDT says that you should prefer O
to B. In contrast, since U (B ) > U (O), no matter your probability for B ,
CDT says you should prefer B toO.
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I agree with orthodoxCDT that EDT’s policy formanaging the news
is irrational. However, I’ve come to think that there are some choices
in which, by ignoring the news your act will provide you, CDT ends
up giving bad advice. I’ll contend that, in these kinds of cases, you
should manage the news—not by giving yourself good news about how
the world is overall, but rather by giving yourself good news about the
degree to which your choice will make the world better. I will begin, in
§2, with choices between two acts. As I’ll explain in §3, choices between
three or more acts present special difficulties.
2 Managing the Improvement News with Two Acts
2.1 Death in Damascus
Consider the following choice.
Death in Damascus
You must choose to travel to either Aleppo or Damascus.
Death has no way of learning where you go; but he has
made a prediction, and he’s currently waiting in the city he
predicted. If you go to the city where Death awaits, you will
die; if you go the other city, you will live. Death is good
at making these predictions, but he’s not perfect. More-
over, he has a tendency to guess Damascus. The probability
that Death is in Damascus, given that you go to Damascus,
is 90%. Whereas the probability that Death is in Aleppo,
given that you go to Aleppo, is only 60%.
Whether you live or die is the only factor relevant to your decision, and
you prefer living to dying. If ‘D’ is the act of going to Damascus, ‘A’ the
act of going to Aleppo, and we use ‘KD ’ and ‘KA’ for Death’s being in
Damascus and Aleppo, respectively, then the relevant desirabilities and
probabilities are shown in table 1.15
In this choice, as in Newcomb’s Problem, the utility of the avail-
able acts depends upon your act probabilities. However, in Newcomb’s
Problem, which act has the highest utility does not vary with your act
15. The case is a modification of one from Gibbard and Harper, “Counterfactuals and
Two Kinds of Expected Utility”, op. cit.. Similar decisions are discussed in Andy Egan,
“Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory,” Philosophical Review, cxvi, 1
(2007): 93–114.
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D(Row Col) KA KD
A 0 10
D 10 0
 Pr(Row | Col) A D
KA 60% 10%
KD 40% 90%

Table 1: Desirabilities and Probabilities for Death in Damascus. The matrix
on the left-hand-side shows the desirability of the row act in the column state.
The matrix on the right shows the probability of the row state, given that you
select the column act.
probabilities—the utility of taking both prizes exceeds the utility of tak-
ing only one, no matter how confident you are that you’ll end up taking
both. In Death in Damascus, on the other hand, which act maximizes
utility does vary with your act probabilities. Let a be the probability that
you go to Aleppo (so that 1− a is the probability that you go to Damas-
cus). Then,16
U (A) = 9− 5a
U (D) = 5a + 1
Therefore, if a is greater than 4/5ths, U (D) > U (A). And, if a is less than
4/5ths, U (A) > U (D). When a is exactly 4/5ths, U (A) = U (D). (See
figure 2.)
On the assumption that you’ve gone to Aleppo, going to Damascus
has a higher utility. And on the assumption that you’ve gone to Dam-
ascus, going to Aleppo has a higher utility. So, as soon as you start to
followCDT’s advice, it will issue new recommendations. As soon as you
find yourself going to Aleppo, and you therefore raise your probability
in the proposition A, CDT will tell you to go to Damascus instead. And
as soon as you find yourself going to Damascus, and therefore raise your
probability in the proposition D , CDT will tell you to go to Aleppo. In
these kinds of cases, the verdicts of CDT are unstable.
What I findmost disturbing about this instability is that it is entirely
predictable. Once it advises you to go to Aleppo and you take its ad-
vice, CDT treats the information that you’ve decided to go to Aleppo,
and that Death likely awaits there, as a reason to reconsider its initial
16. For those who wish to check the math, some advice: multiply the matrix D(Row Col)
(of the desirability of the row act in the column state) by thematrix Pr(Row|Col) (of the
probability of the row state, given the column act), to get the matrix UCol(Row) (of the
utility of the row act, given that you’ve selected the column act). Then: you may use
the identity U (Row) =∑ColUCol(Row) · Pr(Col) to derive the unconditional utilities.
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Figure 2: Death in Damascus. In solid black, the utility of A as a function
of Pr(A). In dashed grey, the utility ofD, as a function of Pr(A).
recommendation. This treats the information as though it were surpris-
ing. But there’s nothing surprising about this information. You were in
a position to know that, by going to Aleppo, you would give yourself ev-
idence that Death is likely in Aleppo. Information you are in a position
to know you will gain, if you decide to A, is information which can be
taken into account before deciding whether to A. CDT’s instability in
cases like Death in Damascus is a sign that it doesn’t take all of the
relevant information into account before issuing its recommendations,
even when it is in a position to do so. Since a theory of rational deci-
sion should take into account all the relevant information it can before
issuing its recommendations, this is a reason to worry about CDT.17
2.2 Cake in Damascus
Next, consider:
17. For independent arguments against this feature of CDT (which I do not endorse),
see Caspar Hare and Brian Hedden, “Self-Reinforcing and Self-Frustrating Decisions,”
Noûs, l, 3 (2016): 604–28. There are deliberational versions of CDT which solve this
issue with instability by advising you to get yourself into a position in which you have
probability 4/5ths that you will go to Aleppo and probability 1/5th that you will go to
Damascus, and, from this deliberative perspective, going to Aleppo and Damascus
have equal utility. From this deliberative standpoint, you should either perform the
mixed act of going toAleppowith probability 4/5ths and going toDamascuswith prob-
ability 1/5th, or else, perhaps, just pick either Aleppo or Damascus. See Brian Skyrms,
The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990),
Frank Arntzenius, “No Regrets, or: Edith Piaf Revamps Decision Theory,” Erkentnis,
lxviii, 2 (2008): 277–97, James M. Joyce, “Regret and Instability in Causal Decision
Theory,” Synthese, clxxxvii, 1 (2012): 123–45, and James M. Joyce, “Deliberation and
Stability in Newcomb Problems and Pseudo-Newcomb Prolems,” in Arif Ahmed, ed.,
Newcomb’s Problem (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
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D(Row Col) KA KD
A 10 0
D 0 10
 Pr(Row | Col) A D
KA 60% 10%
KD 40% 90%

Table 2: Desirabilities and Probabilities for Cake in Damascus.
Cake in Damascus
You must choose to travel to either Aleppo or Damascus.
You know that your fairy godmother has left you cake in
one of these cities. The cake awaits wherever she predicted
you would go. She is good at making these predictions, but
she’s not perfect. Moreover, she has a tendency to guess
Damascus. The probability that cake is in Damascus, given
that you go to Damascus, is 90%. Whereas the probability
that cake is in Aleppo, given that you go to Aleppo, is only
60%.
Whether you have cake or not is the only factor relevant to your deci-
sion, and you’d rather have cake. Again, use ‘A’ for the act of going to
Aleppo, ‘D’ for the act of going to Damascus, and ‘KA’ and ‘KD ’ for the
cake being in Aleppo and Damascus, respectively. Then, your desirabil-
ities and probabilities are as shown in table 2.18
Again, let a be the probability that you go to Aleppo. Then,
U (A) = 5a + 1
U (D) = 9− 5a
Therefore, if a is greater than 4/5ths, U (A) > U (D). And, if a is less than
4/5ths, U (D) > U (A). When a is exactly 4/5ths, U (A) = U (D). (See
figure 3.)
Conditional on you going to Aleppo, going to Aleppo will have a
higher utility than going to Damascus. And, conditional on you going
to Damascus, going to Damascus will have a higher utility that going
to Aleppo. Which act CDT says is permissible depends upon how con-
fident you are, at the beginning of deliberation, that you will end up
selecting that act at deliberation’s end. If you begin deliberation think-
ing that you’re very likely to go to Aleppo, then CDT recommends that
18. Similar decisions are discussed in Daniel Hunter and Reed Richter, “Counterfactuals
and Newcomb’s Paradox,” Synthese, xxxix, 2 (1978): 249–61.
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Figure 3: Cake in Damascus. In solid black, the utility of A, as a function of
Pr(A). In dashed grey, the utility ofD, as a function of Pr(A).
you go to Aleppo. On the other hand, if you begin deliberation think-
ing that you’re just as likely to go to Aleppo as Damascus, then CDT
recommends going to Damascus.
Perhaps this is as it should be. Perhaps your initial probability that
you’ll go to Aleppo gives you information about what your fairy god-
mother predicted. And information about what was predicted is in-
formation about where the cake awaits. If you start out thinking that
you’re likely to go to Aleppo, then it’s likely that you were predicted to
go to Aleppo, and so it’s likely that cake awaits in Aleppo. Perhaps. For
perhaps your initial probabilities are ‘tickles’ which provide information
about which prediction was made (cf. §1.3).
We needn’t, and shouldn’t, deny that the tickles of our initial proba-
bilities can teach us something about the likely consequences of our ac-
tions. But, just as in our discussion of Newcomb’s Problem, we should
deny that they will always do so—and for the same reasons. Firstly, you
may not have introspective access to your own probabilities.19 Secondly,
you need not be following the advice of CDT in order for CDT to give
that advice. Suppose that you follow EDT. In that case, you will defi-
nitely go to Damascus, since UD (D) > UA(A). If you follow EDT, then
your initial act probabilities are not relevant to how you end up choos-
ing; for they correlate not at all with the choice you eventually make.
However, if your initial act probability for A was greater than 4/5ths,
then CDT will say that you’ve chosen irrationally. It will say that you
should have seen your high initial act probability for A as a reason to go
to Aleppo. It will say this, even though your initial act probability for
A doesn’t provide any information about what was predicted, or where
19. Perhaps a suitably idealized agent would have introspective access to their own prob-
abilities. Even so, you may not. See Lewis, “Causal DecisionTheory”, op. cit..
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the cake awaits. (Had you been a causal decision theorist, it may have;
but, since you’re an evidential decision theorist, it doesn’t.)
Suppose you begin deliberation more than 80% confident that you
will go to Aleppo. If you then decide to go to Damascus, CDT will call
your decision irrational. It will say that you’re rationally obligated to go
to Aleppo. However, once you learn that you’ve so decided, your prob-
ability for Awill drop below 80%, and CDT will change its mind, saying
that it is (now) rationally obligatory for you to go to Damascus. The
advice of CDT therefore conflicts with the following plausible principle
governing rational choice: if it’s now in your power to doA, A is permis-
sible, and after you do A, it will be permissible for you choose B, then, it
is now permissible for you to do A and then choose B. To see the con-
flict, note that it is now in your power to raise your probability that you’ll
go to Damascus. Moreover, it is rationally permissible for you to do so.
The only rational norms which govern your probabilities are epistemic
norms. But you are now in a position to manufacture the evidence that
you will go to Damascus by simply forming the intention to do so; these
intentions will rationalize a higher probability for D .20 So it is permis-
sible to raise your probability that you will go to Damascus. Once you
do so, CDT will say that it is rational for you to go to Damascus. So our
principle says that it is permissible for you to raise your probability that
you will go to Damascus and, then, to go to Damascus. But, so long as
your probability for A remains above 80%, CDT will disagree. So CDT
must deny the principle.
2.3 Expected Improvement
As I said above, I believe that what leads EDT into error is not that it
manages the news; rather, it is that it manages the wrong kind of news. It
tells you to give yourself good news about how the world is overall—
including factors which are outside of your control. In Newcomb’s
Problem, it says to give yourself propitious news about the provisions
of nature. And this is irrational. The provisions of nature are outside of
20. As arch-causal decision theorist James M. Joyce puts it: “...a rational agent, while in
the midst of her deliberations, is in a position to legitimately ignore any evidence she
might possess about what she is likely to do. She can readjust her probabilities for
her currently available acts at will...A deliberating agent who regards herself as free
need not proportion her beliefs about her own acts to the antecedent evidence that she
has for thinking that she will perform them.” (Joyce, “Are Newcomb Problems Really
Decisions?”, op. cit., at p. 557, italics in original.)
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your control; they do not speak in favor of acting one way or another.
In their attempt to avoid EDT’s irrational managing of the news, causal
decision theorists have said that you should ignore any news the per-
formance of an act will carry with it. But there are two, importantly
different, kinds of news that the performance of an act can give you. In
the first place, the performance of an act can give you evidence about
the provisions of nature. This kind of evidence is rightly disregarded.
But so too can the performance of an act give evidence about the degree
to which it will improve upon the provisions of nature. And this kind
of evidence is not rightly disregarded. Causalists should be opposed to
managing the news about utility. For utility encodes your (current) es-
timation of how desirable the world is as a whole. It conflates goods
the world has provided with goods you are in a position to bring about.
Causalists should instead manage the news about what your choice will
do to make things better or worse.
If you face a choice between two acts, A and B, and you are in the
stateK, thenD(AK )−D(BK ) tells us howmuchmoreA would improve
the world than B would. You don’t know which state you’re in, but the
expectation
I(A,B ) def= ∑
K
Pr(K )[D(AK )−D(BK )]
= U (A)−U (B )
says how much more than B you expect A to do to make the world bet-
ter. (Notice that I(B ,A) = −I(A,B ).) In a choice between two acts, A
and B, I(A,B ) will be greater than I(B ,A) if and only if U (A) is greater
than U (B ).21 So, at least in a choice between two acts, saying that you
should prefer A to B iff A does more to improve things than B would
is equivalent to saying that you should prefer A to B iff A has a higher
utility than B does.
2.4 Improvement News
The reason for reformulating causal decision theory in this way is that it
allows us tomanage the news aboutwhat your acts will do to improve the
world while ignoring news about the provisions of nature. In choosing
21. To see this, note that I(A,B ) = U (A)−U (B ) and I(B ,A) = U (B )−U (A). So I(A,B ) >
I(B ,A) iff U (A)−U (B ) > U (B )−U (A) iff U (A) > U (B ).
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A, you may give yourself news about the quantity I(A,B ). Conditional
on your choosing A, the degree to which you’ll expect A to do more to
improve things than B would is given by:
IA(A,B ) def=
∑
K
Pr(K | A)[D(AK )−D(BK )]
= UA(A)−UA(B )
In a choice between two acts,A andB, EDTmanages the utility news
by comparingUA(A) toUB (B ), and preferring the actwhich gives the best
news about utility. I suggest that the causalist manage the improvement
news by comparing IA(A,B ) to IB (B ,A), and preferring the act which
gives the best news about howmuchmore it would do to improve things
than the alternative.
Let’s not just ask about which of A and B gives better improvement
news. Let’s additionally ask about how much better or worse A’s im-
provement news is thanB ’s, in a pairwise comparison. Call that quantity
‘N (A,B )’.
N (A,B ) def= IA(A,B )− IB (B ,A)
Then, ifN (A,B ) > 0, A gives better improvement news thanB does, and
I say that you have reason to prefer A to B. IfN (A,B ) < 0, then B gives
better improvement news than A, and I say you have reason to prefer B
toA. IfN (A,B ) = 0, then A andB give equally good improvement news,
and I say you have reason to be indifferent betweenA andB. (Notice that
N (B ,A) = −N (A,B ).)
In cases like Newcomb’s Problem, there is no interesting improve-
ment news to manage. B will get you an additional $10,000, no mat-
ter what. (See figure 4a.) In Cake in Damascus and Death in Dam-
ascus, in contrast, there is interesting improvement news to manage.
Take Cake in Damascus first. While both A and D give good news
about what they are doing to make the world better than the alternative
would,D gives better news thanA does. IA(A,D) = 2 and ID (D ,A) = 8,
soN (D ,A) = 6. So I say that you have reason to preferD to A. (See fig-
ure 4b.) In Death in Damascus, both A andD give the bad news that
they are doing less to improve things than the alternative would. Even
so, the bad news that D gives is worse than the bad news that A gives.
IA(A,D) = −2 and ID (D ,A) = −8, so N (A,D) = 6. So I say you have
reason to prefer A toD.
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(a) Newcomb’s Problem (b) Cake in Damascus
Figure 4: In figure 4a, the solid black line is the degree to which B is expected
to do more to improve the world than O, as a function of Pr(B ). The dashed
grey line is the degree to which O is expected to improve the world more than
B, as a function of Pr(B ). In figure 4b, the solid black line is the degree to which
A is expected to improve the world more than D, as a function of Pr(A). And
the dashed grey line is the degree to which D is expected to improve the world
more than A, as a function of Pr(A).
3 Managing the Improvement News with More than Two Acts
David J. Barnett agrees withme about how to choose between two acts.22
Moreover, for Barnett, this is the entire story. According to him, you
should prefer A to B iff you would prefer A to B, were you forced to
choose between the two. Thus: you should prefer A to B iffN (A,B ) > 0,
and you should be indifferent between A and B iff N (A,B ) = 0. As
Barnett recognizes, this theory leads to cyclic preferences in some cases.
3.1 Improvement Cycle
Consider Improvement Cycle:
Improvement Cycle
Before you are three boxes, labeled ‘P’, ‘Q’, and ‘R’. You must
choose one and only one of the boxes. If it was predicted
that youwould choose P, then $50was left inR and the other
boxes were left empty. If it was predicted that you would
choose R, then $100 was left in Q and the other boxes left
22. See David James Barnett, “Graded Ratifiability” (m.s.). If we choose an appropriate
‘benchmark’, then so too does Ralph Wedgewood—in his “Gandalf ’s Solution to the
Newcomb Problem,” Synthese, cxc, 14 (2013):2643–75. (See Barnett’s “Graded Ratifia-
bility,” op. cit., which shows that, in the two-act case, Barnett’s account is equivalent to
Wedgewood’s when the ‘benchmark’ is given by averaging.)
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
D(Row Col) KP KQ KR
P 0 150 0
Q 0 0 100
R 50 0 0
 
Pr(Row|Col) P Q R
KP 80% 10% 10%
KQ 10% 80% 10%
KR 10% 10% 80%

Table 3: Desirabilities and probabilities for Improvement Cycle.
empty. If it was predicted that you would choose Q, then
$150 was left in P and nothing was left in the other boxes.
These predictions are 80% reliable.
Desirabilities and probabilities for improvement cycle are shown in
table 3.23
Improvement Cycle is so-called because, when compared pair-
wise, P gives better improvement news than Q does, Q gives better
improvement news than R does, and R gives better improvement news
than P does. If you are given a choice between just P andQ , your choice
is like Newcomb’s Problem.24 No matter how likely you are to choose
P or Q , P will be expected to make things better than Q would. If you
take P, you’ll expect P to improve the world by 5 more dollars than Q
would, IP (P,Q ) = 5, and if you take Q , you’ll expect P to improve
the world by 110 more dollars than Q would, IQ (Q ,P ) = −110. So
N (P,Q ) = 115, and Barnett concludes that you should prefer P to Q .
Similarly, if you are given a choice between just Q and R, you will ex-
pect thatQ would make things better than R would, no matter your act
probabilities. IQ (Q ,R) = 5 and IR (R ,Q ) = −75. SoN (Q ,R) = 80, and
Barnett concludes that you should preferQ toR. Finally, if you are given
a choice between justR andP, then your choice is likeDeath inDamas-
cus. Both options will give you the bad news that you could likely make
things better by choosing the other. However, P’s bad news is worse
than R’s is. IP (P,R) = −25 and IR (R ,P ) = −10. SoN (R ,P ) = 15, and
Barnett concludes that you should prefer R to P. If you follow Barnett’s
23. Compare Improvement Cycle with the decision from Arif Ahmed’s “Push the But-
ton,” Philosophy of Science, lxxix, 3 (2012): 386–95, and the ‘three crates’ case from
Hare and Hedden, “Self-Reinforcing and Self-Frustrating Decisions,” op. cit.. Both of
these decisions will lead Barnett’s theory to advise you to adopt cyclic preferences.
24. When I say that the choice is ‘like Newcomb’s Problem’, I simply mean that one act is
expected to make things better than the alternative, no matter your act probabilities. I
don’t mean to say that one option causally dominates the other.
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advice, then you’ll prefer P to Q to R to P. So your preferences will be
cyclic.
To my mind, cyclic preferences like these are irrational. Strict pref-
erence should be transitive and it should be irreflexive, so it should be
acyclic.25,26 Fortunately, managing the improvement news need not lead
us into cyclic preferences like these. In Improvement Cycle, there
are three pairwise comparisons, and three corresponding pieces of im-
provement news to manage:
N (P,Q ) = 115 N (Q ,R) = 80 N (R ,P ) = 15
Thefirst two pieces of improvement news are more noteworthy than the
third. They give you strong pro tanto reason to prefer P toQ and to pre-
fer Q to R. The final piece of improvement news gives you a weaker
pro tanto reason to prefer R to P. If you are to avoid cycles, you cannot
respond to all of these reasons.27 But you can respond to the strongest
reasons you have by preferring P to Q to R. And this is what I recom-
mend you do.
In general: I recommend you draw up a list of all your reasons, and
form preferences which respond to as many of them as you can, while
giving priority to the stronger reasons. So, take an arbitrary pair of op-
tions, A,B (with A ̸= B). IfN (A,B ) > 0, then you have pro tanto reason
to prefer A to B. So include this preference, ‘A ≻ B’, on your list. If
N (A,B ) = 0, then you have pro tanto reason to be indifferent between
A and B. So include this indifference, ‘A ∼ B’, on your list. Do this
for every pair of distinct options. Now: order the preferences on your
list by the strength of the reasons speaking in their favor. That is: if
N (A,B ) > N (C ,D) ¾ 0, then A ≻ B should come before C ≻ D (or
25. From transitivity and irreflexivity, acyclicity follows. For suppose there is a cycle lead-
ing from A1 to itself. By transitivity, A1 ≻ A1, contradicting irreflexivity. So, if ≻ is
transitive and irreflexive, there can be no cycles.
26. In fact, I’m inclined to say something stronger: cyclic preferences aren’t just
irrational—they’re impossible. It’s not possible to prefer an option to itself, and pre-
ferring A to B and B toC is incompatible with preferringC to A. (To prefer A to B and
B to C requires you to be robustly disposed to trade C for B, and to trade B for A; but
since trading C for B for A just is a way of trading C for A, and you know this, you’ll
not have a robust disposition to trade A for C, so you won’t count as preferring A to
C.) However, you needn’t accept this stronger claim to accept everything else I have
to say here.
27. If you agree with me that cyclic preferences are impossible, then the antecedent will be
unnecessary, and we can simply say: you cannot respond to all of these reasons.
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C ∼ D) on your list. Start at the top, and work your way down. As
soon as you encounter an entry such that it, together with the previ-
ous entries, would lead to a cycle, strike it from the list.28 You have pro
tanto reason to hold that preference, but that reason has been overrid-
den by the stronger reasons above it. Continue down the list, striking
any preference you encounter which, together with the unstruck prefer-
ences above it, would lead to a cycle. Once you’ve reached the bottom of
your list, transitively close the strict preferences and indifferences which
remain,29 and extend strict preferences along indifferences—that is, if ei-
ther A ∼ B ≻C or A ≻ B ∼C, then include the strict preference A ≻C.30
That’s almostmy entire theory of practical rationality—but for a com-
plication with cycles generated by equally weighty reasons (§3.2). The
impatient reader may feel free to skip ahead to §4.
3.2 Symmetric Improvement Cycle
Above, I imposed only one requirement on your list: that the preferences
appearing on it be ordered by the strength of the reasons speaking in
their favor. That is, if N (A,B ) > N (C ,D) ¾ 0, then A ≻ B should
come before C ≻D (or C ∼D). But what ifN (A,B ) =N (C ,D)? Then,
either preference could come first. You face an arbitrary choice of which
of these two, equally strong, reasons to respond to first. This arbitrary
choice can end up making a difference to the preferences you form at
the end of the day.
For instance, consider:
Symmetric Improvement Cycle
Everything is as in Improvement Cycle, except: if it was
predicted that you would take P, then $100 was left in R; if
it was predicted that you would take R, then $100 was left
28. Terminology: a cycle is a sequence of options A1,A2, . . . ,AN such that: (a) for each
i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,N − 1}, either Ai ≻ Ai+1 or Ai ∼ Ai+1; (b) either AN ≻ A1 or AN ∼ A1;
and (c) either Ai ≻ Ai+1 for some i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,N − 1} or else AN ≻ A1.
29. That is: if A ≻ B and B ≻ C, then include the strict preference A ≻ C. And, if A ∼ B
and B ∼C, then include the indifference A ∼C.
30. This theory of rational preference is formally identical to the voting theory of Tide-
man, with the strength of improvement newsN (A,B ) swapped out for the size of can-
didate A’s majority over candidate B. This isn’t an accident—the theory was inspired
by Tideman’s. See Thorwald Nicolaus Tideman, “Independence of Clones as a Crite-
rion forVotingRules,” Social Choice andWelfare, iv, 3 (1987): 185–206. Formore on the
connections between voting and decision theory, see R.A. Briggs, “Decision-Theoretic
Paradoxes as Voting Paradoxes,” Philosophical Review, cxix, 1 (2010): 1–30.
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in Q; and, if it was predicted that you would take Q, then
$100 was left in P.
If you take P, then you’ll expect that R would make things better. If you
takeQ , then you’ll expect that P would make things better. And, if you
take R, then you’ll expect thatQ would make things better.
IP (P,Q ) = 0 IQ (Q ,P ) = −70 IR (R ,P ) = 0
IP (P,R) = −70 IQ (Q ,R) = 0 IR (R ,Q ) = −70
So youhave three, equally good, pieces of improvement news tomanage:
N (P,Q ) = 70 N (Q ,R) = 70 N (R ,P ) = 70
So: you have pro tanto reason to prefer P toQ , pro tanto reason to prefer
Q to R, pro tanto reason to prefer R to P, and each of these reasons is as
strong as the others. If you are to avoid cyclic preferences, you cannot
respond to all of these reasons. By the symmetry of the case, it seems
clear that you should end up indifferent between P,Q , and R. However,
following my advice from §3.1, you could draw up any of the following
lists:
1. P ≻Q
2. Q ≻ R
3. R ≻ P
1. P ≻Q
2. R ≻ P
3. Q ≻ R
1. Q ≻ R
2. P ≻Q
3. R ≻ P
1. Q ≻ R
2. R ≻ P
3. P ≻Q
1. R ≻ P
2. P ≻Q
3. Q ≻ R
1. R ≻ P
2. Q ≻ R
3. P ≻Q
For each list, I advised you to keep the first two preferences and strike the
third. You could then end up with any of the following three preference
orderings:
P ≻Q ≻ R
Q ≻ R ≻ P
R ≻ P ≻Q
Arbitrary choices aboutwhich of three equally strong reasons you choose
to respond to last should not end up making a difference to the prefer-
ences you hold at the end of the day. So we should not say that any
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of these preferences are rationally permissible. Instead, we should find
some way of undoing the effects of this arbitrary choice.
In cases like Symmetric Improvement Cycle, your reasons for
holding some preference are tied with your reasons for holding another
preference. When you draw up your list, then, you will end up break-
ing this tie by placing one of these preferences below the other. If, to-
gether, these tied preferences would complete a cycle, then your ar-
bitrary choice about which preference to place beneath the other is a
choice about which preference in the potential cycle to strike from your
list. Thereby, it is a choice about which option in the potential cycle
to most prefer and which to least prefer. For example, in Symmetric
Improvement Cycle, whenever the preference P ≻ Q is placed at the
bottom of your list, Q ends up being the most preferred option and P
ends up being the least preferred option.
In general, making a choice to place a preference A ≻ B lower on
your list is a way of arbitrarily favoringB and disfavoringA. (And, there-
fore, placing A ≻ B higher is arbitrarily favoring A and disfavoring B.)
For placing A ≻ B lower on your list means that it is more likely to be
struck. And if A ≻ B is struck, then it would have completed a cycle,
so then there is some sequence of options C1,C2, . . . ,CN , such that the
preferences B ≽ C1 ≽ C2 ≽ · · · ≽ CN ≽ A (with at least one of these
preferences strict) remain unstruck. So, if A ≻ B is struck, then A will
be (at least weakly) dispreferred to each of C1,C2, . . . ,CN , and B will be
(at least weakly) preferred to each of C1,C2, . . . ,CN .
To undo the effects of these arbitrary tie breaks, I suggest that we
consider every arbitrary way of favoring some options over others that
would lead you to break these ties in one way or another. And if an
option ends up at the top of your preference ordering on at least one
of these ways of breaking ties, then I will say that it is permissible to
choose that option.31 More carefully, I’ll say that a way of breaking ties
is rationalizable iff it is determined by some (arbitrary) strict order of
your options, Â, in a way that meets the following three constraints.
Firstly, if N (A,C ) = N (B ,C ) > 0, then the preference A ≻ C comes
before B ≻ C, favoring A and disfavoring B, iff A Â B. Secondly, if
N (C ,A) = N (C ,B ) > 0, then C ≻ B comes before C ≻ A, favoring
A and disfavoring B, iff A Â B. And finally, if N (A,C ) = N (B ,C ) =
31. An option A is at the top of your preference ordering iff there is no option B such that
B ≻ A. Note that there could be more than one option at the top of an ordering.
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N (A,D) = N (B ,D) = 0, then A ∼ C comes before C ∼ B iff A ∼ D
comes beforeD ∼ B.
This third constraint requires some explanation. When it comes to
indifferences like A ∼ B, placing them higher will sometimes favor A
and sometimes favor B. Due to the symmetry of the indifference rela-
tion, we can’t say in general how breaking these ties will affect the final
preferences. However, if we have a chain of indifference running from
A to B, A ∼ C ∼ B, and placing A ∼ C before C ∼ B favors A over B (or
vice versa) then, if we’re given another chain of indifference, A ∼D ∼ B,
placing A ∼D beforeD ∼ B will also favor A over B (or vice versa). For,
whatever potential cycles running from A to B might have motivated
placing A ∼ C above C ∼ B in the first case are also potential cycles
which will motivate placing A ∼ D above D ∼ B in the second case.
So, while we can’t say in general how someone who favored A over B
would be motivated to break ties, we can note a consistency constraint
on those choices: for any A,B,C, andD: if A ∼C is placed aboveC ∼ B,
then A ∼D should also be placed aboveD ∼ B.
If an option ends up at the top of your preference ordering, given
at least one rationalizable way of breaking ties, then let us say that it
is permissible to choose that option. More carefully, here is the com-
plete algorithm for managing the improvement news: first, list all of the
preferences which you have pro tanto reason to hold, ordered by the
strength of the reasons you have to hold them. If there are ties, where
you have equally strong reasons to hold two or more preferences, then
consider all the lists which result frombreaking those ties in a rationaliz-
able way.32 Call these the initial lists. On each initial list, if a preference,
combined with the preceding unstruck preferences, would lead to a cy-
cle, then strike it from the list. Once this is done, generate a preference
ordering from each initial list, in the way described in §3.1. Call each
resulting preference ordering preliminary. For instance, in Symmetric
Improvement Cycle, each of P ≻ Q ≻ R, Q ≻ R ≻ P, and R ≻ P ≻ Q
are preliminary preference orderings. If an option is at the top of some
32. If I did not require ties to be broken in a rationalizable way, then my theory of rational
preference would not be independent of clones in the sense defined in §4. (Without a
rationalizable tie-breaking method, Lemma 1 in the appendix would be false.) The ex-
amplewhich illustrates this is too complicated to include here—it involves seven acts—
but the interested reader should consult Example 1 in T. M. Zavist and T. N. Tide-
man, “Complete Independence of Clones in the Ranked Pairs Rule,” Social Choice and
Welfare, xi, 2 (1989): 167–73. (Note: what I am calling a ‘rationalizable’ tie-breaking
method is not what Zavist and Tideman call an ‘impartial’ tie-breaking method.)
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preliminary preference ordering, then say that it is a ‘tier 1’ option. The
tier 1 options are all and only the permissible options. In Symmetric
Improvement Cycle, for instasnce, P, Q , and R are all tier 1 options,
and they are all permissible.
Given this procedure for selecting permissible options, wemay con-
struct a full preference ordering. If an optionwould be permissible, were
all the tier 1 options removed from the menu, then say that it is a ‘tier 2’
option. If an option would be permissible, were all the tier 1 and tier 2
options removed from the menu, then say that it is a ‘tier 3’ option. And
so on. In general, for k > 1, if an option would be permissible, were all
options of tier k − 1 or lower removed from the menu, then say that it
is a ‘tier k ’ option. If A is a tier n option and B is a tier k option, then A
should be preferred toB if n < k ,B should be preferred toA if n > k , and
you should be indifferent between A and B if n = k . Or, more concisely,
A is to be weakly preferred to B iff A’s tier is no greater than B’s.
4 Further Discussion
This completesmy theory of how to rationallymanage the improvement
news when you’re choosing between arbitrarily many options. In this
section, I’ll apply the theory to some illustrative cases and note some of
its properties.
4.1 The Frustrator
Consider the following choice:
The Frustrator
Before you are three boxes, labeled ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’. Youmust
choose one and only one of the boxes. Yesterday, a reliable
predictor, known as the Frustrator, made a prediction about
how you would choose. If she predicted that you would
choose A, then $100 was left in B and nothing was left in
A. If she predicted that you would choose B, then $100 was
left in A and nothing was left in B. If she predicted that you
would chooseC, then $40was left in bothA andB. There is
a guaranteed $40 inC, nomatterwhatwas predicted. These
predictions are 80% reliable.
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
D(Row Col) KA KB KC
A 0 100 40
B 100 0 40
C 40 40 40
 
Pr(Row|Col) A B C
KA 80% 10% 10%
KB 10% 80% 10%
KC 10% 10% 80%

Table 4: Desirabilities and probabilities for the Frustrator.
Desirabilities and probabilities for the Frustrator are in table 4.33
If you choose A, then you’ll expect thatCwould make things better,
and Bwould make things better still. If you choose B, then you’ll expect
thatC would make things better, and A would make them better still. If
you choose C, then you’ll expect that either A or B would make things
(slightly) better.
IA(A,B ) = −70 IB (B ,A) = −70 IC (C ,A) = −2
IA(A,C ) = −26 IB (B ,C ) = −26 IC (C ,B ) = −2
So no matter which option you select, you will be giving yourself the
bad news that some other option would likely make things better. In a
pairwise comparison,A andB both give equally bad improvement news,
so you’ve no more reason to prefer A to B than you do to prefer B to A.
C, however, gives much better news than either A or B when compared
pairwise:
N (A,B ) = 0 N (C ,B ) = 24 N (C ,A) = 24
So I say that you have pro tanto reason to prefer C to A, C to B, and to
be indifferent between A and B. There’s no obstacle to responding to all
of these reasons, so I say that you should have the preference ordering
C ≻ A ∼ B.
Orthodox CDT disagrees. It says that you should prefer at least one
of A and B to C. Let a be your probability that A, and let b be your
probability that B . (So that 1− a − b is your probability that C .) Then,
U (A) = 42+ 42b − 28a
33. Similar decisions are discussed in Arif Ahmed “Dicing with Death,” Analysis, lxxiv, 4
(2014): 587–92, and Jack Spencer and Ian Wells, “Why Take Both Boxes?,” Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, xcix, 1 (2019): 27–48.
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U (B ) = 42+ 42a − 28b
U (C ) = 40
So, if a > b , then U (B ) > U (C ). If b > a, then U (A) > U (C ). If a = b ,
then U (A) = U (B ) > U (C ). For no act probability does C have a higher
utility than both A and B .
Suppose that you always begin deliberation thinking you’re equally
likely to select any of the available options. And suppose that you are
given a choice between just A and C—B is taken off the menu (though
there’s still a 10% probability that the Frustrator falsely predicted that B).
In that case, at the beginning of deliberation, U (A) = 42− (28/2) = 28,
while U (C ) = 40. So CDT would tell you to prefer C to A. Suppose,
on the other hand, that you are given a choice between just B and C—
A is taken off of the menu. In that case, at the beginning of delibera-
tion, U (B ) = 28 and U (C ) = 40. So CDT would tell you to prefer C to
B. C is, in other words, a Condorcet winner. In voting theory, a Con-
dorcet winner, named after the Marquis de Condorcet, is a candidate
who would win in a one-on-one contest with any other candidate. Like-
wise, in the Frustrator, were you given a choice between C and any
other alternative, and your act probabilities are uniform, then orthodox
CDT would advise you to most prefer C. Nonetheless, if you are given
a choice between A,B, and C, and your act probabilities are uniform,
orthodox CDT will say to disprefer C to both A and B.
In contrast, if youmanage the improvement news, then, if youwould
prefer an option to every alternative in a pairwise choice between the
two, then it will always be yourmost preferred option overall. Similarly:
if you manage the improvement news, then, if you would disprefer an
option to every alternative in a pairwise choice between the two, then it
will always be your least preferred option overall. To understand why,
see the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 in the appendix.
4.2 Clone-Independence
Say that an option C∗ is a clone of another option C iff C∗ is identical
to C in all respects that you care about—that is, for all states of nature
K, Pr(K | C ∗) = Pr(K | C ) and D(K C ∗) = D(K C ). And say that a the-
ory of rational preference is independent of clones iff adding or remov-
ing a clone doesn’t affect your preferences between the other options.
This seems to me to be a property that any reasonable theory of rational
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choice should possess; but notice that, if you always begin deliberation
thinking that you’re equally likely to select any option, then orthodox
CDT will not be independent of clones.
Take, for instance, Cake in Damascus, from §2.2. If you begin de-
liberation thinking that you’re just as likely to choose A as D, then or-
thodox CDT will tell you to prefer D (and it won’t at any point reverse
this judgment as your act probability forD rises to 100%). But suppose
that we introduce 4 additional ‘clones’ of the Aleppo option—perhaps
there are 5 different paths leading to Aleppo, all equally good, and only
one path to Damascus. Then, your choice is not between A and D, but
instead between A1,A2,A3,A4,A5 and D. If you start out thinking that
you’re equally likely to pick each each path, then orthodox CDTwill tell
you to prefer each path to Aleppo to the path to Damascus.34
In contrast, if you manage the improvement news in the way I’ve
suggested, then you will prefer the path to Damascus to each path to
Aleppo (and you’ll be indifferent between the different paths toAleppo).
This follows from amore general principle: managing the improvement
news is independent of clones, and always counsels indifference between
clones. To understand why this is so, see the proofs of Propositions 3
and 4 in the appendix.35
4.3 Causal Ratifiability
Say that an option A is causally ratifiable iff IA(A,B ) ¾ 0, for all B (or,
equivalently, iff UA(A) ¾ UA(B ), for all B). A causally ratifiable act is one
that you will expect to do the most good possible, once you’ve chosen it.
Managing the improvement newswill sometimes lead you to least prefer
the only causally ratifiable option. Consider the following decision:
Three Shells
Before you are three shells, labeled ‘F’, ‘G’, and ‘H’. Youmust
34. A defender of orthodox CDT may wish to protest that, in order for C∗ to really be a
clone of C, your initial probability for C∗ must be the same as it was for C. In that
case, consider Cake in Damascus with an initial probability for A of 5/11ths. Then,
orthodox CDT will say to prefer D to A. If a clone for A is then introduced, your
probability forDwill be 1/11th, in which case, orthodox CDT will say to prefer A toD.
35. Managing the improvement news has this property for roughly the same reason that
Tideman’s voting method (as emended in Zavist and Tideman, “Complete Indepen-
dence of Clones in the Ranked Pairs Rule”, op. cit.) is independent of clones—though
Tideman’s definition of ‘clone’ is different from mine, and Zavist and Tideman’s cri-
terion of ‘impartiality’ is different from my criterion of ‘rationalizability’.
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
D(Row Column) KF KG KH
F 1 1 1
G 0 9 10
H 0 10 9

Table 5: Desirabilities for Three Shells.
choose one, and only one, of the shells. There’s a guaranteed
$1 under shell F, nomatter what. If it was predicted that you
would choose F, then nothing was left under shells G and
H. If it was predicted that youwould chooseG, then $9was
left under G and $10 was left under H. If it was predicted
that you would chooseH, then $10 was left underG and $9
was left underH.
Desirabilities for this case are shown in table 5. For simplicity, assume
that these predictions are 100% reliable.36
Note that F is causally ratifiable, since, if you take F, you’ll be certain
that there’s nothing under either G or H. And note that neither G nor
H is causally ratifiable, since, if you take G, then you’ll be certain that
there’s more money under H; and, if you take H, you’ll be certain that
there’s more money under G.
IF (F,G ) = 1 IG (G ,F ) = 8 IH (H ,F ) = 8
IF (F,H ) = 1 IG (G ,H ) = −1 IH (H ,G ) = −1
So F is the only option which is causally ratifiable. Nonetheless, if you
manage the improvement news in theway that I’ve suggested, then you’ll
end up preferring both G and H to F. For you’ll have three pieces of
improvement news to manage:
N (G ,F ) = 7 N (G ,H ) = 0 N (H ,F ) = 7
Thus, you have reason to prefer G to F, you have reason to prefer H to
F, and you’ve no more reason to prefer G toH than you have reason to
preferH to G. There’s no obstacle to responding to all of these reasons,
36. Thedecision comes from Brian Skyrms, Pragmatics and Empiricism (NewHaven: Yale
University Press, 1984).
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so you should be indifferent between G and H and prefer both to F:
G ∼H ≻ F.
4.4 Causal Dominance
Managing the improvement news will sometimes lead you to violate the
principle of Causal Dominance:
Causal Dominance
If D causally dominates A—i.e., if D(DK ) > D(AK ), for
each state of nature K—thenD is to be preferred to A.
I expect many causalists to see this as a deficit of a theory of rational
choice; however, I urge caution. Note that the theory will always say that
you have pro tanto reason to prefer a dominating option to the option
it dominates. After all, if D(DK ) > D(AK ), for every K , then it must
be that N (D ,A) > 0. In most cases, you will be able to respond to this
pro tanto reason without forming cyclic preferences, and the theory will
say that D is to be preferred to A. Nonetheless, there are some esoteric
cases in which your pro tanto reason to disprefer a causally dominated
option can be overridden. Moreover, in these esoteric cases, I believe
that managing the improvement news agrees with, and helps to explain,
our intuitive verdicts.
For a case like this, consider:
The Semi-Frustrator
Before you are two boxes, a white box and a black box. You
may point to either box, and you will be given that box’s
contents. Yesterday, the Frustratormade a prediction about
which box you would point to. If she predicted that you
would point to the black box, then she put $100 in the white
box and left the black box empty. If she predicted that you
would point to the white box, then she put $100 in the black
box and left the white box empty. She is excellent at these
predictions—but only when you point to the boxes with
your left hand. (Perhaps because she bases the prediction
on a brain scan of only your right hemisphere.) Given that
you point with your left hand, you are 100% sure that she
correctly predicted where you’d point. However, given that
you point with your right hand, you’re only 50% sure that
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
D(Row Column) KB KW
B 0 100
W 100 0
B∆ −∆ 100−∆
W∆ 100−∆ −∆

Pr(Row|Column) B W B∆ W∆
KB 100% 0% 50% 50%
KW 0% 100% 50% 50%

Table 6: Desirabilities and probabilities for the Semi-Frustrator.
she predicted correctly. You may point with either hand,
but, if you use your right, then you must pay a pittance,∆.
In The Semi-Frustrator, you have four available acts: point to black
with your left hand, B, point to black with your right hand, B∆, point
to white with your left hand, W, and point to white with your right
hand,W∆. And there are two states of nature: either the Frustrator pre-
dicted black, KB , or the Frustrator predicted white, KW . Desirabilities
and probabilities for the case are as shown in table 6.37
If you choose B, you’ll expect that W and W∆ would make things
much better, and that B∆ would make things slightly worse. Likewise,
if you chooseW, you’ll expect that B and B∆ would make things much
better, and that W∆ would make things slightly worse. If you choose
either of B∆ orW∆, then you won’t expect that the other would make
things any better, and you’ll expect that both of B andW would make
things slightly better,
IB (B ,W ) = −100 IB (B ,W∆) =∆− 100 IB (B ,B∆) =∆
IW (W ,B ) = −100 IW (W ,B∆) =∆− 100 IW (W ,W∆) =∆
IB∆(B∆,B ) = −∆ IB∆(B∆,W ) = −∆ IB∆(B∆,W∆) = 0
IW∆(W∆,B ) = −∆ IW∆(W∆,W ) = −∆ IW∆(W∆,B∆) = 0
So, you have the following pieces of improvement news to manage:
N (B∆,W ) = 100− 2∆ N (B ,B∆) = 2∆ N (B ,W ) = 0
N (W∆,B ) = 100− 2∆ N (W ,W∆) = 2∆ N (B∆,W∆) = 0
37. This decision comes from Spencer and Wells, “Why Take Both Boxes?,” op. cit..
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You have strong pro tanto reason to prefer B∆ toW, and strong pro tanto
reason to preferW∆ to B. And you have a weaker pro tanto reason to
prefer B to B∆ andW toW∆. You can’t respond to all of these reasons,
since they lead to the cycle B∆ ≻ W ≻ W∆ ≻ B ≻ B∆. But you can
respond to the strongest reasons you have by forming the preferences
B∆ ≻W andW∆ ≻ B. Following the advice from §3.1, you then face an
arbitrary choice about whether to put the preference B ≻ B∆ above or
below the preferenceW ≻W∆ on your initial list. The former will lead
you to the preference orderingW∆ ≻ B ≻ B∆ ≻W, while the latter will
lead you to the preference ordering B∆ ≻ W ≻ W∆ ≻ B. Undoing the
effects of this arbitrary choice in the way outlined in §3.2, you’ll end up
with the final preferences: B∆ ∼W∆ ≻ B ∼W.
But note that, in the Semi-Frustrator, pointing to either box with
your right hand is causally dominated by pointing to that box with your
left. No matter whether the Frustrator has predicted black or white,
pointing to a box with your left hand would get you a pittance more
than pointing to that box with your right. Nonetheless, pointing to a
box with your right hand does seem to bemore rational than pointing to
that box with your left. Indeed, Spencer andWells presented the Semi-
Frustrator as a counterexample to Causal Dominance. We should
be cautious about our first-pass judgments in these kinds of cases, but,
on reflection, I’m inclined to endorse the judgment, and regard this as a
problem for the Causal Dominance principle, and not a problem for
managing the improvement news.
If you manage the improvement news, then you’ll think that what’s
true in the Causal Dominance principle is that you will always have a
distinctive and compelling reason to disprefer a causally dominated op-
tion: you are certain that, no matter what the world is like, some other
option would do more good than it will. However, in cases like the
Semi-Frustrator, something similar is true of the causally dominat-
ing option: given that you choose it, you’ll be certain that some option
would do more good than it. For instance: you have a compelling rea-
son to disprefer B∆ to B—namely, B certainly would do a pittance more
good than B∆. But something similar is true of B: if you choose B, then
you’ll be certain thatW would do more good than it.
If you manage the improvement news, you’ll think that the Semi-
Frustrator is analogous to the following counterexample to Causal
Dominance: God asks you to name any natural number, n, whereupon
he will provide you with n days in heaven. In this decision, every option
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is causally dominated—nonetheless, it does not appear that no option is
permissible. One common thing to say about this case is that selecting
a causally dominated option is usually irrational because it means pass-
ing up a more preferable option. However, when you have an infinite
hierarchy of ever-more-preferable options, then, for every option, there
is another option which is preferable to it. In that case, you’ve no choice
but to pass up a more preferable option. If something speaks against
every option, then it speaks against none of them.
If you manage the improvement news, then you should say some-
thing analogous about the Semi-Frustrator: for every option, there
is an alternative which you have pro tanto reason to prefer to it. (This
can happen with a finite number of options because your pro tanto rea-
sons for preference can form cycles.) The fact that B∆ is causally dom-
inated by B means that, if you choose B∆, then you’re passing up a pro
tantomore preferable option; however, in this decision, you’ve no choice
but to pass up a pro tanto more preferable option. Everyone’s sin is no
one’s sin; so, in cases like this, being causally dominated need not speak
against an option.
A Technicalities
To review, this is the algorithm for managing the improvement news
(‘MIN’): first, list the preferences you have pro tanto reason to hold, or-
dered by the strength of the reasons you have to hold those preferences.
So: for all A,B,C,D, if N (A,B ) > N (C ,D) ¾ 0, then A ≻ B comes be-
fore C ≻ D (or C ∼ D). If there are ties, where you have equally strong
reasons to hold multiple preferences, then consider all the lists which
result from breaking ties in a rationalizable way. (A tie-breaking pro-
cedure is rationalizable iff there is some strict ordering of the options,
Â, such that, for all A,B, C, and D: (a) ifN (A,C ) =N (B ,C ) > 0, then
A ≻C comes before B ≻C iff A Â B, (b) ifN (C ,A) =N (C ,B ) > 0, then
C ≻ B comes before C ≻ A iff A Â B, and (c) if N (A,C ) = N (B ,C ) =
N (A,D) = N (B ,D) = 0, then A ∼ C comes before C ∼ B iff A ∼ D
comes beforeD ∼ B.) Call these the initial lists. For each initial list, if a
preference, combined with the preceding unstruck preferences, would
lead to a cycle, then strike it from the list. With the remaining prefer-
ences, transitively close strict preferences and indifferences and extend
strict preference along indifference. Call each resulting preference or-
dering preliminary. If an option is at the top of some preliminary prefer-
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ence ordering, then it is a permissible option, and we say that it is a ‘tier
1’ option. For k > 1, if an option would be permissible were all options
of tier k − 1 or lower eliminated, then say that it is a ‘tier k ’ option. A is
to be weakly preferred to B iff A’s tier is no greater than B’s.
Definition 1. ⊤ is a Condorcet winner iff, for every alternative A ̸= ⊤,
N (⊤,A) > 0.
Proposition 1. If ⊤ is a Condorcet winner, then MIN says that ⊤ is to be
preferred to every other alternative.
Proof. If ⊤ a Condorcet winner, then all initial lists will include ⊤ ≻ A,
for every alternative A. No other preferences will lead you to strike ⊤ ≻
A from the list. For take any two alternatives, A,B. Either A ≻ B, B ≻ A,
or A ∼ B. None of these possibilities lead to a cycle when combined
with the preferences ⊤ ≻ A and ⊤ ≻ B. So every preliminary preference
ordering will have ⊤ as the unique top element. So ⊤ will be the only
tier 1 option.
Definition 2. ⊥ is a Condorcet loser iff, for every alternative A ̸= ⊥,
N (A,⊥) > 0.
Proposition 2. If ⊥ is a Condorcet loser, then MIN says that ⊥ is to be
dispreferred to every alternative.
Proof. If ⊥ is a Condorcet loser, then all initial lists will include A ≻ ⊥,
for every alternative A. No other preference will lead you to strike A ≻ ⊥
from the list. For take any two alternatives, A,B . Either A ≻ B , B ≻ A,
or A ∼ B . None of these possibilities lead to a cycle when combined
with the preferences A ≻ ⊥ and B ≻ ⊥. So every preliminary preference
ordering on any menu will have ⊥ as the unique bottom element. So
every alternative will have a lower tier than ⊥. So ⊥ will be dispreferred
to every alternative.
Some notation: for distinct options X and Y, use ‘[X,Y]’ for the pref-
erence X ≻ Y if N (X ,Y ) > 0, Y ≻ X if N (X ,Y ) < 0, and X ∼ Y if
N (X ,Y ) = 0. And use ‘N [X ,Y ]’ formax{N (X ,Y ),N (Y ,X )}.
Definition 3. C and C∗ are clones iff, for each state of nature K, Pr(K |
C ) = Pr(K | C ∗) andD(K C ) =D(K C ∗).
It follows immediately from this definition that, if C and C∗ are clones,
then, for any option X ̸=C,C∗,N [X ,C ] =N [X ,C ∗].
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Lemma 1. If C and C∗ are clones, then, for all options A ̸= C,C∗, [A,C]
will be struck from an initial list iff [A,C∗] is also struck.
Proof. Define a relation of C -precedence over the options besidesC and
C∗ as follows: if [A,C] comes before [B,C] on the initial list, then A C -
precedes B. And similarly define a relation of C ∗-precedence: if [A,C∗]
comes before [B,C∗] on the initial list, then A C ∗-precedes B. If ties
are broken in a rationalizable way, it follows that A C -precedes B iff A
C ∗-precedes B,38 and we can simply say that A precedes B. Precedence
provides a strict ordering of the options besidesC andC∗, whichwemay
then use to induce an enumeration of those options, , A1,A2, . . . ,AN ,
where Ai precedes Ai+1, for each i ¾ 1.
Suppose now that there is some option A such that either [A,C] is
struck and [A,C∗] is not, or else [A,C∗] is struck and [A,C] is not. Let
A f be the f irst such option, given our enumeration, and wlog, suppose
that [A f ,C] is struck and [A f ,C∗] is not. Since the preference between
A f andC is struck, it must form a cycle with some earlier unstruck pref-
erences. At least one of these earlier preferencesmust involveC. Choose
one and call it ‘[Ae ,C]’. Then, we have a potential cycle of unstruck pref-
erences: either C ≽ Ae ≽ · · · ≽ A f or C ≼ Ae ≼ · · · ≼ A f (where at least
one of these preferences is strict). Since [Ae ,C] is above [A f ,C] on the
initial list, Ae precedes A f . So the preference [Ae ,C∗] cannot be struck
(since [Ae ,C] is unstruck, and by hypothesis A f is the first option A in
our enumeration such that exactly one of [A,C] and [A,C∗] is struck).
So, when we arrive at the preference [A f ,C∗], we will have a potential
cycle: either A f ≽ C∗ ≽ Ae ≽ · · · ≽ A f or C∗ ≼ Ae ≼ · · · ≼ A f (with
at least one of these preferences strict). So we will strike [A f ,C∗]. This
contradicts our assumption that there is an option A such that one of
[A,C] and [A,C∗] was struck and the other was not. So there can be no
such option.
38. Suppose A C -precedes B. Then, eitherN [A,C ]>N [B ,C ] orN [A,C ] =N [B ,C ]. In
the first case,N [A,C ∗]>N [B ,C ∗], soA C ∗-precedes B. IfN [A,C ] =N [B ,C ], then:
either (1)N [A,C ] > 0 or (2)N [A,C ] = 0. In case (1), either (i) [A,C] = A ≻ C or (ii)
[A,C] = C ≻ A. In case (i), A ≻ C comes before B ≻ C, so there’s some strict order Â
which rationalizes the initial list such thatA Â B. But then, sinceN (A,C ∗) =N (B ,C ∗)
andA Â B, it must be thatA ≻C∗ comes beforeB ≻C∗, whereforeA C ∗-precedesB. In
case (ii), C ≻ A comes before C ≻ B, so there’s some strict order Â which rationalizes
the initial list such that B Â A. But then, since N (C ∗,A) = N (C ∗,B ) and B Â A, it
must be that C∗ ≻ A comes before C∗ ≻ B, wherefore A C ∗-precedes B. In case (2),
since A ∼ C comes before C ∼ B, A ∼ C∗ must come before C∗ ∼ B (since the initial
list is rationalizable). So A will C ∗-precede B. (The opposite direction is exactly the
same, with ‘C ’ swapped out for ‘C ∗’ and ‘C ∗’ swapped out for ‘C ’.)
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Proposition 3. If C and C∗ are clones, then, on every preliminary prefer-
ence ordering, C ∼C∗.
Proof. Suppose, for reductio, that C ̸∼ C∗. Since C and C∗ are clones,
N (C ,C ∗) = 0, and the initial list includes C ∼ C∗. Therefore, if C ≻ C∗
in the preliminary ordering, theremust be some optionsA1, . . . ,AN such
that the sequence of preferences C ≽ A1 ≽ · · · ≽ AN ≽ C∗ (with at least
one of these preferences strict) all come beforeC ∼C∗ on the list, and all
remain unstruck. Since C and C∗ are clones, C∗ ≽ A1 must also appear
on the list. Since this is inconsistent with the preliminary preference
ordering, the preference C∗ ≽ A1 must be struck. So C∗ ≽ A1 is struck
and C ≽ A1 is not. But this is impossible, by Lemma 1. So C ∼C∗.
Notation: given a menu of optionM, let P(M) be the set of permissible
(or ‘tier 1’) options onM.
Definition 4. A theory of rational choice is independent of clones iff: if
C and C∗ are clones, M∗ is a menu of options which includes C and C∗,
M def= M∗ \ {C∗}, and A ∈ M, then it is permissible to select A from the
menuM iff it is permissible to select A from the menuM∗: A ∈ P(M∗) iff
A ∈ P(M).
Proposition 4. MIN is independent of clones.
Proof. Suppose that A ∈ P(M). Then, there is some preliminary pref-
erence ≽L over the options in M, constructed from an initial list L ,
such that A is at the top of ≽. Turning to the larger menuM∗, consider
the list L ∗ which is identical to L , except that, for all A ̸= C,C∗, the
preference [A,C∗] is added immediately after [A,C]. Let ≽∗ be the pre-
liminary preference constructed from this list. There is no preference
which is struck from L but not from L ∗, since there are fewer pref-
erences above each entry on L—if a preference doesn’t lead to a cycle
with the preferences above it onL ∗, it can’t lead to a cycle with a subset
of those preferences. So, in particular, there is no preference of the form
B ≻ A which is struck fromL but not fromL ∗. Since all such prefer-
ences must have been struck fromL for A to be a top element, all such
preferences will be struck fromL ∗ as well, and A will be a top element
of ≽∗. So A ∈ P(M∗).
Going in the other direction, suppose that A ∈ P(M∗). Then, there
is a preliminary preference ≽∗ over the options inM∗, constructed from
an initial listL ∗, such that A is at the top of ≽∗. LetL be just likeL ∗,
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except that all preferences involving C∗ have been removed. Suppose
that there is some preference [X,Y] which is struck fromL ∗ but which
remains unstruck on L . Since [X,Y] is struck from L ∗, it must enter
into a cycle with some of the unstruck preferences above it. C∗ must be
in this cycle (else, the same cyclewould be created inL ). So [X,Y] either
creates a cycle of the form X ≽∗ Y ≽∗ · · · ≽∗ C∗ ≽∗ . . .X or a cycle of the
form Y ≽∗ X ≽∗ · · · ≽∗ C∗ ≽∗ . . . Y (with at least one of these preferences
strict). By Lemma 1, if preferences involving C∗ remain unstruck, then
so too do the corresponding preferences involving C. So, onL ∗, [X,Y]
either leads to a cycle of the form X ≽∗ Y ≽∗ · · · ≽∗ C ≽∗ . . .X or a cycle
of the form Y ≽∗ X ≽∗ · · · ≽∗ C ≽∗ . . . Y. All of these preferences will
remain unstruck on L , since there are fewer preferences above them
on L than there are on L ∗. So [X,Y] will also be struck from L . So
there are no preferences struck fromL ∗ which are not also struck from
L . And, in particular, there is no preference of the form B ≻ A which is
struck from L ∗ but not from L . Since all such preferences are struck
from L ∗, all such preferences are also struck from L . So A will be at
the top of ≽. So A ∈ P(M).
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